Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome. / Olsen, Asmus Leth.

In: Public Management Review , Vol. 19, No. 9, 2017, p. 1352-1364.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Olsen, AL 2017, 'Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome', Public Management Review , vol. 19, no. 9, pp. 1352-1364. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2017.1281998

APA

Olsen, A. L. (2017). Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome. Public Management Review , 19(9), 1352-1364. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2017.1281998

Vancouver

Olsen AL. Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome. Public Management Review . 2017;19(9):1352-1364. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2017.1281998

Author

Olsen, Asmus Leth. / Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome. In: Public Management Review . 2017 ; Vol. 19, No. 9. pp. 1352-1364.

Bibtex

@article{4afa6e7588ea4a19a429e866fceeffd1,
title = "Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome",
abstract = "When faced with a problem, policymakers have a choice of action or inaction. Psychological research shows varying results on how individuals evaluate (in)actions conditional on the subsequent outcome. I replicate, generalize, and extend this research into a public management setting with two independent experiments embedded in a nationally representative sample of Danish citizens (n = 2,007). Both experiments show that actions are evaluated more positively than inactions – regardless of the outcome. This finding runs contrary to the inaction (or omission) bias but is consistent with evidence on a “norm of action”, in response to poor performance in political–administrative settings.",
keywords = "Attribution, behavioural public administration, blame avoidance, omission bias",
author = "Olsen, {Asmus Leth}",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1080/14719037.2017.1281998",
language = "English",
volume = "19",
pages = "1352--1364",
journal = "Public Management Review",
issn = "1471-9037",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis Online",
number = "9",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Responding to problems: actions are rewarded, regardless of the outcome

AU - Olsen, Asmus Leth

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - When faced with a problem, policymakers have a choice of action or inaction. Psychological research shows varying results on how individuals evaluate (in)actions conditional on the subsequent outcome. I replicate, generalize, and extend this research into a public management setting with two independent experiments embedded in a nationally representative sample of Danish citizens (n = 2,007). Both experiments show that actions are evaluated more positively than inactions – regardless of the outcome. This finding runs contrary to the inaction (or omission) bias but is consistent with evidence on a “norm of action”, in response to poor performance in political–administrative settings.

AB - When faced with a problem, policymakers have a choice of action or inaction. Psychological research shows varying results on how individuals evaluate (in)actions conditional on the subsequent outcome. I replicate, generalize, and extend this research into a public management setting with two independent experiments embedded in a nationally representative sample of Danish citizens (n = 2,007). Both experiments show that actions are evaluated more positively than inactions – regardless of the outcome. This finding runs contrary to the inaction (or omission) bias but is consistent with evidence on a “norm of action”, in response to poor performance in political–administrative settings.

KW - Attribution

KW - behavioural public administration

KW - blame avoidance

KW - omission bias

U2 - 10.1080/14719037.2017.1281998

DO - 10.1080/14719037.2017.1281998

M3 - Journal article

VL - 19

SP - 1352

EP - 1364

JO - Public Management Review

JF - Public Management Review

SN - 1471-9037

IS - 9

ER -

ID: 173628360