Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. / Andersson, Ola; Galizzi, Matteo M.; Hoppe, Tim; Krantz, Sebastian; van der Wiel, Karen; Wengström, Erik Roland.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2010, p. 16-18.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Andersson, O, Galizzi, MM, Hoppe, T, Krantz, S, van der Wiel, K & Wengström, ER 2010, 'Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games', Economics Letters, vol. 108, no. 1, pp. 16-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

APA

Andersson, O., Galizzi, M. M., Hoppe, T., Krantz, S., van der Wiel, K., & Wengström, E. R. (2010). Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 108(1), 16-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

Vancouver

Andersson O, Galizzi MM, Hoppe T, Krantz S, van der Wiel K, Wengström ER. Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. Economics Letters. 2010;108(1):16-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

Author

Andersson, Ola ; Galizzi, Matteo M. ; Hoppe, Tim ; Krantz, Sebastian ; van der Wiel, Karen ; Wengström, Erik Roland. / Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. In: Economics Letters. 2010 ; Vol. 108, No. 1. pp. 16-18.

Bibtex

@article{a9879b10a51f11df928f000ea68e967b,
title = "Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games",
abstract = "We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, communication in games, cheap talk",
author = "Ola Andersson and Galizzi, {Matteo M.} and Tim Hoppe and Sebastian Krantz and {van der Wiel}, Karen and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
note = "JEL classification: C72, C91, D83",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011",
language = "English",
volume = "108",
pages = "16--18",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Galizzi, Matteo M.

AU - Hoppe, Tim

AU - Krantz, Sebastian

AU - van der Wiel, Karen

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

N1 - JEL classification: C72, C91, D83

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

AB - We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - communication in games

KW - cheap talk

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

M3 - Journal article

VL - 108

SP - 16

EP - 18

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 21332309