Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes. / Midjord, Rune.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 119, No. 3, 06.2013, p. 261–263.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Midjord, R 2013, 'Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes', Economics Letters, vol. 119, no. 3, pp. 261–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

APA

Midjord, R. (2013). Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes. Economics Letters, 119(3), 261–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

Vancouver

Midjord R. Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes. Economics Letters. 2013 Jun;119(3): 261–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

Author

Midjord, Rune. / Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes. In: Economics Letters. 2013 ; Vol. 119, No. 3. pp. 261–263.

Bibtex

@article{c5baab11024a4d6fa92c70797284f6e7,
title = "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes",
abstract = "A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents{\textquoteright} preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Full implementation, Direct mechanism, Verifiable information, Rank-order tournaments",
author = "Rune Midjord",
note = "JEL classification: D82",
year = "2013",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028",
language = "English",
volume = "119",
pages = " 261–263",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

AU - Midjord, Rune

N1 - JEL classification: D82

PY - 2013/6

Y1 - 2013/6

N2 - A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.

AB - A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Full implementation

KW - Direct mechanism

KW - Verifiable information

KW - Rank-order tournaments

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

M3 - Journal article

VL - 119

SP - 261

EP - 263

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 96089284