Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

  • Rune Midjord
A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume119
Issue number3
Pages (from-to) 261–263
Number of pages3
ISSN0165-1765
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2013

Bibliographical note

JEL classification: D82

ID: 96089284