Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union. / Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder.

In: Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 27, No. 8, 23.01.2020, p. 1215-1235.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Hermansen, SSL 2020, 'Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 27, no. 8, pp. 1215-1235. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697

APA

Hermansen, S. S. L. (2020). Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(8), 1215-1235. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697

Vancouver

Hermansen SSL. Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy. 2020 Jan 23;27(8):1215-1235. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697

Author

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder. / Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union. In: Journal of European Public Policy. 2020 ; Vol. 27, No. 8. pp. 1215-1235.

Bibtex

@article{f00401dc80b0469e8a60af2b581fd04e,
title = "Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union",
abstract = "Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a {\textquoteleft}judge-rapporteur{\textquoteright} who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court{\textquoteright}s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges{\textquoteright} political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges{\textquoteright} renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts{\textquoteright} internal organization for judicial independence.",
author = "Hermansen, {Silje Synn{\o}ve Lyder}",
year = "2020",
month = jan,
day = "23",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "1215--1235",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "8",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union

AU - Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder

PY - 2020/1/23

Y1 - 2020/1/23

N2 - Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges’ renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts’ internal organization for judicial independence.

AB - Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges’ renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts’ internal organization for judicial independence.

UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 1215

EP - 1235

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 8

ER -

ID: 288790237