Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges’ renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts’ internal organization for judicial independence.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of European Public Policy |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 8 |
Pages (from-to) | 1215-1235 |
ISSN | 1350-1763 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 23 Jan 2020 |
ID: 288790237