(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament

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(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. / Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder.

In: The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, 02.01.2018, p. 148-172.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Hermansen, SSL 2018, '(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament', The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 148-172. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631

APA

Hermansen, S. S. L. (2018). (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 24(1), 148-172. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631

Vancouver

Hermansen SSL. (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies. 2018 Jan 2;24(1):148-172. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631

Author

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder. / (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. In: The Journal of Legislative Studies. 2018 ; Vol. 24, No. 1. pp. 148-172.

Bibtex

@article{e6fc1eaf98f1441fb7ab883865e7da6c,
title = "(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament",
abstract = "Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members in terms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups. In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both their collective needs and individual requests.This article explores situations in which the collective need for information is prioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year period (2004–2014) in three of the most powerful EP committees, as well as key career choices among members.EP groups emphasise policy-specific knowledge. They also pay attention to individual members{\textquoteright} requests for exposure, but only when the expected policy drift is minimal. Harsh selection during the allocation of codecision reports creates pressure to accommodate a greater selection of legislators during other attractive report allocations. Own-initiative reports therefore affect allocation of codecision reports negatively.",
author = "Hermansen, {Silje Synn{\o}ve Lyder}",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
pages = "148--172",
journal = "The Journal of Legislative Studies",
issn = "1357-2334",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament

AU - Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder

PY - 2018/1/2

Y1 - 2018/1/2

N2 - Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members in terms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups. In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both their collective needs and individual requests.This article explores situations in which the collective need for information is prioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year period (2004–2014) in three of the most powerful EP committees, as well as key career choices among members.EP groups emphasise policy-specific knowledge. They also pay attention to individual members’ requests for exposure, but only when the expected policy drift is minimal. Harsh selection during the allocation of codecision reports creates pressure to accommodate a greater selection of legislators during other attractive report allocations. Own-initiative reports therefore affect allocation of codecision reports negatively.

AB - Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members in terms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups. In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both their collective needs and individual requests.This article explores situations in which the collective need for information is prioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year period (2004–2014) in three of the most powerful EP committees, as well as key career choices among members.EP groups emphasise policy-specific knowledge. They also pay attention to individual members’ requests for exposure, but only when the expected policy drift is minimal. Harsh selection during the allocation of codecision reports creates pressure to accommodate a greater selection of legislators during other attractive report allocations. Own-initiative reports therefore affect allocation of codecision reports negatively.

UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631

U2 - 10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631

DO - 10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631

M3 - Journal article

VL - 24

SP - 148

EP - 172

JO - The Journal of Legislative Studies

JF - The Journal of Legislative Studies

SN - 1357-2334

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 288792273