Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure: Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam

Research output: Working paper › Research

Standard

Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure : Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam . / Arndt, Thomas Channing; Garcia, Andres ; Tarp, Finn; Thurlow, James .

Helsinki : UNU-WIDER, 2010.

Research output: Working paper › Research

Harvard

Arndt, TC, Garcia, A, Tarp, F & Thurlow, J 2010 'Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure: Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam ' UNU-WIDER, Helsinki.

APA

Arndt, T. C., Garcia, A., Tarp, F., & Thurlow, J. (2010). Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure: Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam . UNU-WIDER.

Vancouver

Arndt TC, Garcia A, Tarp F, Thurlow J. Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure: Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam . Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 2010.

Author

Arndt, Thomas Channing ; Garcia, Andres ; Tarp, Finn ; Thurlow, James . / Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure : Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam . Helsinki : UNU-WIDER, 2010.

Bibtex

@techreport{80763479ba46458db2ca4abdbfc67dac,
title = "Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure: Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam ",
abstract = "This paper uses a unique panel dataset on firm-level corruption. It contains quantitative information on bribe payments by a sample of formal and informal Vietnamese firms. We show that bribe incidence is highly associated with firm-level differences in (i) visibility, (ii) sunk costs, (iii) ability to pay, and (iv) level of interaction with public officials. Moreover, when informal firms become formal the probability of paying bribes increases. Becoming formal is also associated with a revenue growth premium that is not driven by self-selection of well-performing firms. On average, this premium outweighs the additional bribe cost of formalization. Formalization embodies net benefits in spite of the growth hampering effects of bribes.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, firm performance, corruption, Vietnam",
author = "Arndt, {Thomas Channing} and Andres Garcia and Finn Tarp and James Thurlow",
note = "JEL classification: O10, O58, C69",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
publisher = "UNU-WIDER",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "UNU-WIDER",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure

T2 - Comparative Path Analysis for Mozambique and Vietnam

AU - Arndt, Thomas Channing

AU - Garcia, Andres

AU - Tarp, Finn

AU - Thurlow, James

N1 - JEL classification: O10, O58, C69

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper uses a unique panel dataset on firm-level corruption. It contains quantitative information on bribe payments by a sample of formal and informal Vietnamese firms. We show that bribe incidence is highly associated with firm-level differences in (i) visibility, (ii) sunk costs, (iii) ability to pay, and (iv) level of interaction with public officials. Moreover, when informal firms become formal the probability of paying bribes increases. Becoming formal is also associated with a revenue growth premium that is not driven by self-selection of well-performing firms. On average, this premium outweighs the additional bribe cost of formalization. Formalization embodies net benefits in spite of the growth hampering effects of bribes.

AB - This paper uses a unique panel dataset on firm-level corruption. It contains quantitative information on bribe payments by a sample of formal and informal Vietnamese firms. We show that bribe incidence is highly associated with firm-level differences in (i) visibility, (ii) sunk costs, (iii) ability to pay, and (iv) level of interaction with public officials. Moreover, when informal firms become formal the probability of paying bribes increases. Becoming formal is also associated with a revenue growth premium that is not driven by self-selection of well-performing firms. On average, this premium outweighs the additional bribe cost of formalization. Formalization embodies net benefits in spite of the growth hampering effects of bribes.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - firm performance

KW - corruption

KW - Vietnam

M3 - Working paper

BT - Poverty Reduction and Economic Structure

PB - UNU-WIDER

CY - Helsinki

ER -

ID: 33626942