Lobbying in the EU Comitology System

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Lobbying in the EU Comitology System. / Nørgaard, Rikke Wetendorff; Nedergaard, Peter; Blom-Hansen, Jens.

In: Journal of European Integration, Vol. 36, No. 5, 4, 14.03.2014, p. 491-507.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Nørgaard, RW, Nedergaard, P & Blom-Hansen, J 2014, 'Lobbying in the EU Comitology System', Journal of European Integration, vol. 36, no. 5, 4, pp. 491-507. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

APA

Nørgaard, R. W., Nedergaard, P., & Blom-Hansen, J. (2014). Lobbying in the EU Comitology System. Journal of European Integration, 36(5), 491-507. [4]. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

Vancouver

Nørgaard RW, Nedergaard P, Blom-Hansen J. Lobbying in the EU Comitology System. Journal of European Integration. 2014 Mar 14;36(5):491-507. 4. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

Author

Nørgaard, Rikke Wetendorff ; Nedergaard, Peter ; Blom-Hansen, Jens. / Lobbying in the EU Comitology System. In: Journal of European Integration. 2014 ; Vol. 36, No. 5. pp. 491-507.

Bibtex

@article{fa20cab8447c4619a5664a8e2fd1f6e5,
title = "Lobbying in the EU Comitology System",
abstract = "Comitology is an important part of the EU{\textquoteright}s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen{\textquoteright}s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.",
author = "N{\o}rgaard, {Rikke Wetendorff} and Peter Nedergaard and Jens Blom-Hansen",
year = "2014",
month = mar,
day = "14",
doi = "10.1080/07036337.2014.889128",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = "491--507",
journal = "Journal of European Integration",
issn = "0703-6337",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Lobbying in the EU Comitology System

AU - Nørgaard, Rikke Wetendorff

AU - Nedergaard, Peter

AU - Blom-Hansen, Jens

PY - 2014/3/14

Y1 - 2014/3/14

N2 - Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.

AB - Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.

U2 - 10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

DO - 10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

M3 - Journal article

VL - 36

SP - 491

EP - 507

JO - Journal of European Integration

JF - Journal of European Integration

SN - 0703-6337

IS - 5

M1 - 4

ER -

ID: 90132391