Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement

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Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement. / Hjorth, Frederik Georg.

In: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2016, p. 692-702.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Hjorth, FG 2016, 'Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement', Political Research Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 692-702. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916658553

APA

Hjorth, F. G. (2016). Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement. Political Research Quarterly, 69(4), 692-702. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916658553

Vancouver

Hjorth FG. Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement. Political Research Quarterly. 2016;69(4):692-702. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916658553

Author

Hjorth, Frederik Georg. / Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement. In: Political Research Quarterly. 2016 ; Vol. 69, No. 4. pp. 692-702.

Bibtex

@article{6768a598a88b4d85a5f350f99a1f91bd,
title = "Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement",
abstract = "Political actors are often assigned roles requiring them to enforce rules without giving in-groups special treatment. But are such institutional roles likely to be successful? Here, I exploit a special case of exogenously assigned intergroup relations: debates in the Danish Parliament, in which Parliament chairmen drawn from parliamentary parties enforce speaking time. Analyzing 5,756 speeches scraped from online transcripts, I provide evidence that speech lengths are biased in favor of the presiding chairman{\textquoteright}s party. On average, speakers of the same party as the presiding chairman give 5 percent longer speeches and are 5 percent more likely to exceed the speaking time limit. The paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating political intergroup bias in a natural setting, suggesting that group loyalties can supersede institutional obligations even in a “least likely” context of clear rules, complete observability, and a tradition of parliamentary cooperation.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, legislatures, social identity theory, group identity, natural experiments, scraping",
author = "Hjorth, {Frederik Georg}",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1177/1065912916658553",
language = "English",
volume = "69",
pages = "692--702",
journal = "Political Research Quarterly",
issn = "1065-9129",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement

AU - Hjorth, Frederik Georg

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Political actors are often assigned roles requiring them to enforce rules without giving in-groups special treatment. But are such institutional roles likely to be successful? Here, I exploit a special case of exogenously assigned intergroup relations: debates in the Danish Parliament, in which Parliament chairmen drawn from parliamentary parties enforce speaking time. Analyzing 5,756 speeches scraped from online transcripts, I provide evidence that speech lengths are biased in favor of the presiding chairman’s party. On average, speakers of the same party as the presiding chairman give 5 percent longer speeches and are 5 percent more likely to exceed the speaking time limit. The paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating political intergroup bias in a natural setting, suggesting that group loyalties can supersede institutional obligations even in a “least likely” context of clear rules, complete observability, and a tradition of parliamentary cooperation.

AB - Political actors are often assigned roles requiring them to enforce rules without giving in-groups special treatment. But are such institutional roles likely to be successful? Here, I exploit a special case of exogenously assigned intergroup relations: debates in the Danish Parliament, in which Parliament chairmen drawn from parliamentary parties enforce speaking time. Analyzing 5,756 speeches scraped from online transcripts, I provide evidence that speech lengths are biased in favor of the presiding chairman’s party. On average, speakers of the same party as the presiding chairman give 5 percent longer speeches and are 5 percent more likely to exceed the speaking time limit. The paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating political intergroup bias in a natural setting, suggesting that group loyalties can supersede institutional obligations even in a “least likely” context of clear rules, complete observability, and a tradition of parliamentary cooperation.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - legislatures

KW - social identity theory

KW - group identity

KW - natural experiments

KW - scraping

U2 - 10.1177/1065912916658553

DO - 10.1177/1065912916658553

M3 - Journal article

VL - 69

SP - 692

EP - 702

JO - Political Research Quarterly

JF - Political Research Quarterly

SN - 1065-9129

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 173706144