Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy. / Rostbøll, Christian F.

In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2009, p. 19-36.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Rostbøll, CF 2009, 'Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 19-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230902738577

APA

Rostbøll, C. F. (2009). Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 12(1), 19-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230902738577

Vancouver

Rostbøll CF. Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2009;12(1):19-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230902738577

Author

Rostbøll, Christian F. / Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy. In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2009 ; Vol. 12, No. 1. pp. 19-36.

Bibtex

@article{6fa33c20f84a11ddb219000ea68e967b,
title = "Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy",
abstract = "Many discussions of deliberative democracy ignore or misunderstand the purposes of the ideal speech situation in Habermas' theory. These purposes are to show the possibility of dissent in actual communication and of supplying a normative standard of social criticism. I elaborate the significance of these purposes and show some of the shortcomings of deliberative theory that ignores them. However, the ideal speech situation fails to supply anything like a strategy for political action under conditions hostile to deliberation. I seek to fill this void by arguing for a limited consequentialism, according to which nondeliberative means are legitimate if and only if they further deliberative goals and do not unnecessarily violate the intrinsic values of public deliberation.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, deliberation, ideal speech situation, Habermas, proceduralism",
author = "Rostb{\o}ll, {Christian F.}",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1080/13698230902738577",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "19--36",
journal = "Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy",
issn = "1369-8230",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political Action in Deliberative Democracy

AU - Rostbøll, Christian F.

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - Many discussions of deliberative democracy ignore or misunderstand the purposes of the ideal speech situation in Habermas' theory. These purposes are to show the possibility of dissent in actual communication and of supplying a normative standard of social criticism. I elaborate the significance of these purposes and show some of the shortcomings of deliberative theory that ignores them. However, the ideal speech situation fails to supply anything like a strategy for political action under conditions hostile to deliberation. I seek to fill this void by arguing for a limited consequentialism, according to which nondeliberative means are legitimate if and only if they further deliberative goals and do not unnecessarily violate the intrinsic values of public deliberation.

AB - Many discussions of deliberative democracy ignore or misunderstand the purposes of the ideal speech situation in Habermas' theory. These purposes are to show the possibility of dissent in actual communication and of supplying a normative standard of social criticism. I elaborate the significance of these purposes and show some of the shortcomings of deliberative theory that ignores them. However, the ideal speech situation fails to supply anything like a strategy for political action under conditions hostile to deliberation. I seek to fill this void by arguing for a limited consequentialism, according to which nondeliberative means are legitimate if and only if they further deliberative goals and do not unnecessarily violate the intrinsic values of public deliberation.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - deliberation

KW - ideal speech situation

KW - Habermas

KW - proceduralism

U2 - 10.1080/13698230902738577

DO - 10.1080/13698230902738577

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 19

EP - 36

JO - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

JF - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

SN - 1369-8230

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 10456192