Democratic Respect and Compromise

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Democratic Respect and Compromise. / Rostbøll, Christian F.

In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 5, 15.05.2017, p. 619-635.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Rostbøll, CF 2017, 'Democratic Respect and Compromise', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 619-635. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2017.1328092

APA

Rostbøll, C. F. (2017). Democratic Respect and Compromise. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 20(5), 619-635. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2017.1328092

Vancouver

Rostbøll CF. Democratic Respect and Compromise. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2017 May 15;20(5):619-635. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2017.1328092

Author

Rostbøll, Christian F. / Democratic Respect and Compromise. In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2017 ; Vol. 20, No. 5. pp. 619-635.

Bibtex

@article{1bdb4b958a744ab5a454eb23797cfe3b,
title = "Democratic Respect and Compromise",
abstract = "Compromise has attained renewed interest among political theorists writing on pluralism and disagreement. It is controversial, however, whether compromise is a mere pragmatic necessity or if it has non-instrumental value. This article argues that the reasons for compromise are inherent in the democratic ideal. Under some conditions, compromise can give greater legitimacy to public policy beyond what is achieved by a mere majority decision, and not merely because of the consequences but because of the very fact that the decision was a compromise. The reason for this is the democratic respect displayed by the act of compromise. Democratic respect goes beyond both the norm of treating one{\textquoteright}s fellow citizens as equals and of respecting them as members of the same community. It is a conception of respect, which requires that we treat fellow citizens as co-rulers. Only the latter conception of respect is both sufficient to explain the moral importance of democratic procedures, including compromise, and an inherently democratic ideal.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Democracy, compromise, respect, Democracy, democratic theory, respect",
author = "Rostb{\o}ll, {Christian F.}",
year = "2017",
month = may,
day = "15",
doi = "10.1080/13698230.2017.1328092",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "619--635",
journal = "Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy",
issn = "1369-8230",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Democratic Respect and Compromise

AU - Rostbøll, Christian F.

PY - 2017/5/15

Y1 - 2017/5/15

N2 - Compromise has attained renewed interest among political theorists writing on pluralism and disagreement. It is controversial, however, whether compromise is a mere pragmatic necessity or if it has non-instrumental value. This article argues that the reasons for compromise are inherent in the democratic ideal. Under some conditions, compromise can give greater legitimacy to public policy beyond what is achieved by a mere majority decision, and not merely because of the consequences but because of the very fact that the decision was a compromise. The reason for this is the democratic respect displayed by the act of compromise. Democratic respect goes beyond both the norm of treating one’s fellow citizens as equals and of respecting them as members of the same community. It is a conception of respect, which requires that we treat fellow citizens as co-rulers. Only the latter conception of respect is both sufficient to explain the moral importance of democratic procedures, including compromise, and an inherently democratic ideal.

AB - Compromise has attained renewed interest among political theorists writing on pluralism and disagreement. It is controversial, however, whether compromise is a mere pragmatic necessity or if it has non-instrumental value. This article argues that the reasons for compromise are inherent in the democratic ideal. Under some conditions, compromise can give greater legitimacy to public policy beyond what is achieved by a mere majority decision, and not merely because of the consequences but because of the very fact that the decision was a compromise. The reason for this is the democratic respect displayed by the act of compromise. Democratic respect goes beyond both the norm of treating one’s fellow citizens as equals and of respecting them as members of the same community. It is a conception of respect, which requires that we treat fellow citizens as co-rulers. Only the latter conception of respect is both sufficient to explain the moral importance of democratic procedures, including compromise, and an inherently democratic ideal.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Democracy

KW - compromise

KW - respect

KW - Democracy

KW - democratic theory

KW - respect

UR - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698230.2017.1328092?tab=permissions&scroll=top

U2 - 10.1080/13698230.2017.1328092

DO - 10.1080/13698230.2017.1328092

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 619

EP - 635

JO - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

JF - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

SN - 1369-8230

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 178493822