Compromise and Toleration: Some Reflections

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch

Standard

Compromise and Toleration : Some Reflections. / Rostbøll, Christian F.

2015. Paper presented at Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab, Kolding, Denmark.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch

Harvard

Rostbøll, CF 2015, 'Compromise and Toleration: Some Reflections', Paper presented at Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab, Kolding, Denmark, 29/10/2015 - 30/10/2015.

APA

Rostbøll, C. F. (2015). Compromise and Toleration: Some Reflections. Paper presented at Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab, Kolding, Denmark.

Vancouver

Rostbøll CF. Compromise and Toleration: Some Reflections. 2015. Paper presented at Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab, Kolding, Denmark.

Author

Rostbøll, Christian F. / Compromise and Toleration : Some Reflections. Paper presented at Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab, Kolding, Denmark.12 p.

Bibtex

@conference{01b06125666348acbc367826cda1a3d9,
title = "Compromise and Toleration: Some Reflections",
abstract = "Political compromise is akin to toleration, since both consist of an {"}agreement to disagree.{"} Compromise and toleration also share a predicament of being regarded as ambiguous virtues that require of us to accept something we actually regard as wrong. However, we misunderstand the nature, justification, and limits of compromise if we see it merely as a matter of toleration. While toleration is mainly a matter of accepting citizens' equal right to co-existence as subjects to law, political compromise includes the parties in making law – it makes them co-authors of law. Toleration entails respecting the plurality of conceptions of the good in society, whereas political compromise embodies the disagreements in coercive laws. This difference between toleration and compromise has two important consequences. First, political compromise is justified in a different manner than is toleration. The justification of compromise goes beyond, even if it includes, respect for each individual's right to determine her own conception of the good to an idea of respect for citizens as co-legislators. Second, the limits of compromise are not the same as the limits of toleration. The conditions for being included in compromise are more stringent than those for being tolerated. Still, the limits of compromise cannot be drawn to narrowly if it is to remain its value as a form of agreement that respects and embodies the differences of opinion in society.",
author = "Rostb{\o}ll, {Christian F.}",
year = "2015",
month = oct,
day = "29",
language = "English",
note = "Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab ; Conference date: 29-10-2015 Through 30-10-2015",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Compromise and Toleration

T2 - Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab

AU - Rostbøll, Christian F.

PY - 2015/10/29

Y1 - 2015/10/29

N2 - Political compromise is akin to toleration, since both consist of an "agreement to disagree." Compromise and toleration also share a predicament of being regarded as ambiguous virtues that require of us to accept something we actually regard as wrong. However, we misunderstand the nature, justification, and limits of compromise if we see it merely as a matter of toleration. While toleration is mainly a matter of accepting citizens' equal right to co-existence as subjects to law, political compromise includes the parties in making law – it makes them co-authors of law. Toleration entails respecting the plurality of conceptions of the good in society, whereas political compromise embodies the disagreements in coercive laws. This difference between toleration and compromise has two important consequences. First, political compromise is justified in a different manner than is toleration. The justification of compromise goes beyond, even if it includes, respect for each individual's right to determine her own conception of the good to an idea of respect for citizens as co-legislators. Second, the limits of compromise are not the same as the limits of toleration. The conditions for being included in compromise are more stringent than those for being tolerated. Still, the limits of compromise cannot be drawn to narrowly if it is to remain its value as a form of agreement that respects and embodies the differences of opinion in society.

AB - Political compromise is akin to toleration, since both consist of an "agreement to disagree." Compromise and toleration also share a predicament of being regarded as ambiguous virtues that require of us to accept something we actually regard as wrong. However, we misunderstand the nature, justification, and limits of compromise if we see it merely as a matter of toleration. While toleration is mainly a matter of accepting citizens' equal right to co-existence as subjects to law, political compromise includes the parties in making law – it makes them co-authors of law. Toleration entails respecting the plurality of conceptions of the good in society, whereas political compromise embodies the disagreements in coercive laws. This difference between toleration and compromise has two important consequences. First, political compromise is justified in a different manner than is toleration. The justification of compromise goes beyond, even if it includes, respect for each individual's right to determine her own conception of the good to an idea of respect for citizens as co-legislators. Second, the limits of compromise are not the same as the limits of toleration. The conditions for being included in compromise are more stringent than those for being tolerated. Still, the limits of compromise cannot be drawn to narrowly if it is to remain its value as a form of agreement that respects and embodies the differences of opinion in society.

M3 - Paper

Y2 - 29 October 2015 through 30 October 2015

ER -

ID: 147097480