Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent

Research output: Working paper › Research

Standard

Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent. / Tyran, Jean-Robert; Feld, Lars P.

Basel : Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA, 2005.

Research output: Working paper › Research

Harvard

Tyran, J-R & Feld, LP 2005 'Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent' Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA, Basel. <http://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/redir.pl?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.crema-research.ch%2Fabstracts%2F2005-17.htm;h=repec:cra:wpaper:2005-17>

APA

Tyran, J-R., & Feld, L. P. (2005). Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent. Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA. http://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/redir.pl?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.crema-research.ch%2Fabstracts%2F2005-17.htm;h=repec:cra:wpaper:2005-17

Vancouver

Tyran J-R, Feld LP. Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent. Basel: Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA. 2005.

Author

Tyran, Jean-Robert ; Feld, Lars P. / Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent. Basel : Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA, 2005.

Bibtex

@techreport{f16651e0a56b11dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent",
abstract = " ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, social norms, voting",
author = "Jean-Robert Tyran and Feld, {Lars P.}",
note = "JEL Classification: C92, D72, K42",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
publisher = "Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

AU - Feld, Lars P.

N1 - JEL Classification: C92, D72, K42

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 -  

AB -  

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - social norms

KW - voting

M3 - Working paper

BT - Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent

PB - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, CREMA

CY - Basel

ER -

ID: 44592