Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Does pay-for-performance–a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency–induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.

Original languageEnglish
JournalPublic Management Review
ISSN1471-9037
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 9 Aug 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

    Research areas

  • equity, pay-for-performance, recruitment, representative bureaucracy, survey experiment

ID: 369988878