Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians: The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence
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Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians : The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence. / Pedersen, Rasmus Tue; Hansen, Kristina Jessen; Pedersen, Lene Holm.
In: International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 34, No. 1, edab034, 2022.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians
T2 - The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence
AU - Pedersen, Rasmus Tue
AU - Hansen, Kristina Jessen
AU - Pedersen, Lene Holm
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Citizens value competence in politicians. However, while offering high pay is a key strategy when recruiting competent candidates in the job market, most citizens are highly averse to paying politicians higher salaries. We argue that this aversion arises from one fundamental concern among citizens: self-interested politicians. Using data from a large-scale preregistered survey experiment, we show that citizens are affected by the argument that higher salaries may attract self-interested politicians, whereas they are not affected by the argument that higher salaries will attract competent politicians. Surprisingly, the more positively citizens view politicians, the more they are affected by the argument about self-interested politicians. These results suggest that citizens may view modest salaries as a guard against self-interested politicians
AB - Citizens value competence in politicians. However, while offering high pay is a key strategy when recruiting competent candidates in the job market, most citizens are highly averse to paying politicians higher salaries. We argue that this aversion arises from one fundamental concern among citizens: self-interested politicians. Using data from a large-scale preregistered survey experiment, we show that citizens are affected by the argument that higher salaries may attract self-interested politicians, whereas they are not affected by the argument that higher salaries will attract competent politicians. Surprisingly, the more positively citizens view politicians, the more they are affected by the argument about self-interested politicians. These results suggest that citizens may view modest salaries as a guard against self-interested politicians
U2 - 10.1093/ijpor/edab034
DO - 10.1093/ijpor/edab034
M3 - Journal article
VL - 34
JO - International Journal of Public Opinion Research
JF - International Journal of Public Opinion Research
SN - 0954-2892
IS - 1
M1 - edab034
ER -
ID: 291127534