Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Notwithstanding some persistent, and likely irresolvable, problem-solving gaps, Social Europe has escaped the joint-decision trap on a regular basis. Most importantly, Treaty base games and arena shifting helped to bring about more secondary law and ECJ-driven political decisions than might have been expected considering the decision rules. Furthermore, progressive steps in European social integration were induced by a 'court-decision trap'. Two examples are studied in depth: health care, and the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum benefits. Indeed, relevant integration was deepened significantly although neither the founding persons of the Treaties nor the governments were willing to create a cross-border market for health care or open social assistance related benefits for exportability.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe EU's Decision Traps : Comparing Policies
PublisherOxford University Press
Publication date22 Sep 2011
ISBN (Print)9780199596225
ISBN (Electronic)9780191729140
Publication statusPublished - 22 Sep 2011

    Research areas

  • Arena shifting, European court of justice, European integration, Social policy, Treaty base game

ID: 201503683