Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review
Notwithstanding some persistent, and likely irresolvable, problem-solving gaps, Social Europe has escaped the joint-decision trap on a regular basis. Most importantly, Treaty base games and arena shifting helped to bring about more secondary law and ECJ-driven political decisions than might have been expected considering the decision rules. Furthermore, progressive steps in European social integration were induced by a 'court-decision trap'. Two examples are studied in depth: health care, and the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum benefits. Indeed, relevant integration was deepened significantly although neither the founding persons of the Treaties nor the governments were willing to create a cross-border market for health care or open social assistance related benefits for exportability.
|Title of host publication||The EU's Decision Traps : Comparing Policies|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Publication date||22 Sep 2011|
|Publication status||Published - 22 Sep 2011|
- Arena shifting, European court of justice, European integration, Social policy, Treaty base game