Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review

Standard

Social Policy : Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps. / Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Falkner, Gerda.

The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Martinsen, DS & Falkner, G 2011, Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps. in The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0008

APA

Martinsen, D. S., & Falkner, G. (2011). Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps. In The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0008

Vancouver

Martinsen DS, Falkner G. Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps. In The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies. Oxford University Press. 2011 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0008

Author

Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg ; Falkner, Gerda. / Social Policy : Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps. The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Bibtex

@inbook{68e08a95c4794b00be7b237f231bfad4,
title = "Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps",
abstract = "Notwithstanding some persistent, and likely irresolvable, problem-solving gaps, Social Europe has escaped the joint-decision trap on a regular basis. Most importantly, Treaty base games and arena shifting helped to bring about more secondary law and ECJ-driven political decisions than might have been expected considering the decision rules. Furthermore, progressive steps in European social integration were induced by a 'court-decision trap'. Two examples are studied in depth: health care, and the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum benefits. Indeed, relevant integration was deepened significantly although neither the founding persons of the Treaties nor the governments were willing to create a cross-border market for health care or open social assistance related benefits for exportability.",
keywords = "Arena shifting, European court of justice, European integration, Social policy, Treaty base game",
author = "Martinsen, {Dorte Sindbjerg} and Gerda Falkner",
year = "2011",
month = sep,
day = "22",
doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0008",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780199596225",
booktitle = "The EU's Decision Traps",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Social Policy

T2 - Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps

AU - Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg

AU - Falkner, Gerda

PY - 2011/9/22

Y1 - 2011/9/22

N2 - Notwithstanding some persistent, and likely irresolvable, problem-solving gaps, Social Europe has escaped the joint-decision trap on a regular basis. Most importantly, Treaty base games and arena shifting helped to bring about more secondary law and ECJ-driven political decisions than might have been expected considering the decision rules. Furthermore, progressive steps in European social integration were induced by a 'court-decision trap'. Two examples are studied in depth: health care, and the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum benefits. Indeed, relevant integration was deepened significantly although neither the founding persons of the Treaties nor the governments were willing to create a cross-border market for health care or open social assistance related benefits for exportability.

AB - Notwithstanding some persistent, and likely irresolvable, problem-solving gaps, Social Europe has escaped the joint-decision trap on a regular basis. Most importantly, Treaty base games and arena shifting helped to bring about more secondary law and ECJ-driven political decisions than might have been expected considering the decision rules. Furthermore, progressive steps in European social integration were induced by a 'court-decision trap'. Two examples are studied in depth: health care, and the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum benefits. Indeed, relevant integration was deepened significantly although neither the founding persons of the Treaties nor the governments were willing to create a cross-border market for health care or open social assistance related benefits for exportability.

KW - Arena shifting

KW - European court of justice

KW - European integration

KW - Social policy

KW - Treaty base game

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84921652580&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0008

DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0008

M3 - Book chapter

AN - SCOPUS:84921652580

SN - 9780199596225

BT - The EU's Decision Traps

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -

ID: 201503683