Non-Performance Pay and Relational Contracting: Evidence from CEO Compensation
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
CEOs are routinely compensated for aspects of firm performance that are beyond their control. This is puzzling from an agency perspective, which assumes performance pay should be efficient. Working within an agency framework, we provide a rational for this seemingly inefficient feature of CEO compensation by invoking the idea of informal agreements, specifically the theory of relational contracting. We derive observable implications to distinguish relational from formal contracting and, using ExecuComp data, find that CEOs' annual cash and equity incentive payments positively correlate with the cyclical component of sales and respond to measures of persistence as relational contracting theory predicts.
|Publication status||Published - 2018|
- Faculty of Social Sciences - relational contracts, CEO compensation, pay‐for‐luck, skimming view