Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume144
Pages (from-to)204-218
ISSN0167-2681
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2017

    Research areas

  • Faculty of Social Sciences - Political selection, Pro-social behavior, Social dilemma, Corruption, Voting, C92, C91, D03, D72, H41

ID: 186156349