Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975
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Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975. / Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter.
In: Public Choice, Vol. 158, No. 3-4, 03.2014, p. 483-497.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Picking a loser?
T2 - A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975
AU - Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter
PY - 2014/3
Y1 - 2014/3
N2 - All democratic systems are theoretically open to so-called election inversions, i.e., instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one alternative but where the actual outcome is another. The paper examines the complex 1975 Danish government formation process, which involved five rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives. We demonstrate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the Condorcet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other government alternatives in head-to-head comparisons. The Danish procedural system of “negative” parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to produce the electoral inversion.
AB - All democratic systems are theoretically open to so-called election inversions, i.e., instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one alternative but where the actual outcome is another. The paper examines the complex 1975 Danish government formation process, which involved five rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives. We demonstrate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the Condorcet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other government alternatives in head-to-head comparisons. The Danish procedural system of “negative” parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to produce the electoral inversion.
U2 - 10.1007/s11127-013-0120-8
DO - 10.1007/s11127-013-0120-8
M3 - Journal article
VL - 158
SP - 483
EP - 497
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
SN - 0048-5829
IS - 3-4
ER -
ID: 50199565