Prize Awarded after the ECPR General Conference 2019

Paper: The shadow of your opponent - On the spatial interdependence of lobbying outcomes across competing camps, organisations and individual lobbyists (with: Benjamin Carl Egerod)

Abstract
Lobbying is essentially a competitive endeavour. Lobbying actors with opposing goals employ their weight in an attempt to move outcomes in their preferred direction; like in a tug of war. The dynamics and effects of this interdependence between opponents are, however, insufficiently addressed by present research. This paper formulates a theory on how the success of one lobbying actor is shaped by the successful lobbying endeavour of opposing lobbyists – a competitive dynamic which can be conceptualized as a form of spatial interdependence. We argue that this competitive dynamic holds on three analytical levels: 1) for lobbying camps favouring the same policy outcome, 2) for opposing lobby organisations, and 3) for competing individual lobbyists in contracting firms. We use data from three datasets to provide evidence of spatial dynamics at all these levels and run Bayesian spatial autogressive probit models to estimate indirect effects of lobbying behaviour on the opponent’s likelihood to succeed. The results reveal important new dynamics about how interdependence between lobbyists conditions their effectiveness. Moreover, the paper can inform other scholars who seek to model or control for multiple forms of interdependence between competing or allied lobbyists.