An important interpretation of Kant’s Philosophy of Right suggests that we should not regard political-legal institutions as mere means for realizing an independently conceived moral end. Particularly, it holds that the relationship between public Right and freedom is constitutive rather than instrumental. The “constitutive interpretation” argues this point mainly in relation to domestic Right and members’ relation to their own state. The latter has resulted in a statist bias in the interpretation of Kant’s notion of Right, which has not adequately dealt with the fact that Kant regards public Right as a system composed of three levels – domestic, international, and cosmopolitan Right. This paper suggests that rather than understanding the constitutive relationship between Right and individual freedom solely in terms of the relationship between the state and its members, we should understand it in terms of the relationship between Right at all three levels and “freedom in the external relation” of all human beings. This interpretation follows from Kant’s acknowledgement of the fact that global interconnectedness has come so far that people and states affect one another across borders. Kant, however, speaks of the state as a “moral person,” and some commentators argue that he is not committed to universal moral individualism. While it is true that Kant does not share the argument of contemporary cosmopolitans, who derive legal cosmopolitanism directly from an independent idea of the equal worth of all human beings, I argue that this does not mean that he is not committed to another, non-instrumental, form of universal moral individualism.